

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**Routing Slip**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	EXDIR		✓		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		✓		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		✓		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		✓		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
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**SUSPENSE**

Date

Remarks:

Executive Secretary

Date

3637 (10-81)

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State Dept. review completed

**International  
Communication  
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Approved For Release 2008/08/18 : CIA-RDP84T00109R000100100029-9

Office of the Director

JUL 2 1982

Executive Registry

82-3466/1



USICA

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
William J. Casey  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

DDI- 5408/82

FROM: Charles Z. Wick  
Director

SUBJECT: Soviet Gas Pipeline

I would like to recall to your attention findings on the Yamal natural gas pipeline from our recent surveys in Western Europe. On the eve of the Versailles Summit, USICA opinion polls found that:

- o Most French (57%), Germans (50%), and Italians (64%) favored building the gas pipeline with the USSR.
- o But nearly one-half (Germany) to two-thirds (Italy and France) changed their minds and opposed the pipeline if they thought that Soviet hard-currency earnings would be used to beef-up Soviet military strength.

Europeans were of several minds on whether buying energy supplies would: make them more vulnerable; moderate Soviet actions; or have no effect. The most popular response was "vulnerable" (32%-37%) -- an increase of 12-14 percent over last year (except in Italy).

On trade generally, Europeans did not see their economies dependent on Soviet trade and, at the same time, their prevailing view was that trade should continue regardless of Soviet actions in Poland and elsewhere.

While having little desire for trade sanctions or halting detente, they agreed with key U.S. positions:

- o The prevailing view (except in Italy) was to restrict "high technology" sales to the USSR. The Italians were split, but a year ago the prevailing view opposed restrictions (as was also true in France).
- o Though desiring trade, they did not want to subsidize the Soviet economy. Most (60% in Italy to 84% in Britain) opposed granting special trade concessions to Moscow -- such as low interest loans and credit.
- o And, Europeans preferred coordinating their Soviet trade policy with the U.S. -- even if it means less trade -- rather than making their own "best deals."

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